we also hVe to provide mechanisms to break the blackmailer's power over the victim. We may need to provide witness protection programs and so on and restraining orders against the blackmailer.
We also want to provide positive incentives to ensure that the blackmailee is rewarded for turning in the blackmailer. For example, we can ensure that the blackmailees are awarded all of the proceeds from the blackmail-commissioned crime. This would ensure that a blackmailer has to constantly fear not only being jailed for as long as the crimes he commandeered, but also that the blackmailee can flip the tables on him *AND* take all the money. This basically eliminates the upside from the blackmail.
In combination with witness protection programs that issue new identities to blackmailees, this might be a strong enough set of incentives.
The main thing is that the blackmailee fears the state's penalties. So if the state attaches a financial reward and multiple vengeance incentives, then the blackmailee will likely come forward. Also, if the state will just award your blackmailee all of the gains from your blackmail scheme, then blackmail becomes extremely uncertain as a worthwhile approach to gaining benefits.
