diff --git a/03-treasury-and-taxation/03-taxation-apologia.md b/03-treasury-and-taxation/03-taxation-apologia.md
index 4a8c064..8716829 100644
--- a/03-treasury-and-taxation/03-taxation-apologia.md
+++ b/03-treasury-and-taxation/03-taxation-apologia.md
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ We can imagine situatiosn where a head-tenant enters other indepagants onto thei
 
 Note that this doesn't make it illegal to accept such an arrangement; accepting to place one's name on a co-tenancy agreement in order to gain the vote carries no legal penalty. It is merely financially risky. This should act as a sufficient disincentive to most rational actors.
 
+If extremely rich, motivated political activists decide to begin placing non-productive people on co-tenancies in order to purchase their vote, we don't think this would be a big deal since:
+
+- They would end up housing the poor in order to purchase their vote, which is desirable.
+- Other rich activists can purchase votes as well to counter the other party.
+- This would result in a market of rich people bidding on poor peoples' votes, and the poor people would be able to sell their votes to the bidder who houses them in the best accomodations.
+- The legislature make the vote concealed, such that it is impossible for the purchased voter provide proof of having voted as directed, so as to also provide a disincentive on the vote-buyer's side.
+  - By creating this much risk and uncertainty on both sides of the transaction, the market would be extremely small and unreliable; and even in its small extent, it would end up being a form of welfare program, in that it would mostly be people renting housing on behalf of the poor, which is again, not an undesirable outcome.
+
 ### Upper limit on taxation:
 
 The number, 10%, can obviously be changed by constitutional amendment, obviously - and only by that means.