Update 08-courts-apologia.md

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# Wellspring courts: Apologia # Wellspring courts: Apologia
# What is a court? ## What is a court?
## Common law and its shortcomings: ### Our current, flawed thinking about what a court process should be:
Traditionally speaking, we tend to think that common law is a process which attempts to make a man subject only to those laws which his fellow man would hold him subject to - and this is the purpose of the jury: the jury has the power to acquit a defendant who has violated a law which the common people do not believe is just. Traditionally speaking, we tend to think that common law is a process which attempts to make a man subject only to those laws which his fellow man would hold him subject to - and this is the purpose of the jury: the jury has the power to acquit a defendant who has violated a law which the common people do not believe is just.
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- It is a jury of common men who reason over the facts and the law. Recall that in a court of record, the magistrate is **not** a judge and does **not** have the power of tribunal, and is merely a staff of the plaintiff's court, so the government's power over the proceeding is curtailed severely. - It is a jury of common men who reason over the facts and the law. Recall that in a court of record, the magistrate is **not** a judge and does **not** have the power of tribunal, and is merely a staff of the plaintiff's court, so the government's power over the proceeding is curtailed severely.
- The jury's own powers of reasoning determine the judgment, and not the preferences of the government's supplied magistrate who, within modern common law jurisdictions, generally usurps power to act as a judge within a court of record where he should only be a magistrate. - The jury's own powers of reasoning determine the judgment, and not the preferences of the government's supplied magistrate who, within modern common law jurisdictions, generally usurps power to act as a judge within a court of record where he should only be a magistrate.
## What should a court process strive to be? ### What is the ideal for a court process?
Common law did well to adopt Aristotle's epistemology and acknowledge that only reason based on the evidence of the senses and introspection could validly arrive at objective conclusions. It was due to this recognition that the common law constrained the criteria for valid evidence and witness testimony to that which could be directly testified to by the senses and introspection; and the jury was to serve as the independent, unbiased, reasoning mind that took in the facts in evidence and reasoned itself to the verdict. Common law did well to adopt Aristotle's epistemology and acknowledge that only reason based on the evidence of the senses and introspection could validly arrive at objective conclusions. It was due to this recognition that the common law constrained the criteria for valid evidence and witness testimony to that which could be directly testified to by the senses and introspection; and the jury was to serve as the independent, unbiased, reasoning mind that took in the facts in evidence and reasoned itself to the verdict.
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The ideal for a court process is **not** that a jury of peers should be the final court of appeal. The ideal that common law was striving to arrive at was that Aristotelian reason itself -- the **law of Identity**, the one true arbiter of objectivity -- should be the final court of appeal. The common law tried, but failed to implement an Aristotelian reasoning process. The ideal for a court process is **not** that a jury of peers should be the final court of appeal. The ideal that common law was striving to arrive at was that Aristotelian reason itself -- the **law of Identity**, the one true arbiter of objectivity -- should be the final court of appeal. The common law tried, but failed to implement an Aristotelian reasoning process.
### Should we abandon the common law process?
Its failure however, was not due to its goal being flawed, but to our knowledge being incomplete. To wit, we know the rules of valid **deductive** inference. Deductive logic has been well understood ever since Aristotle formalized it during his floruit. But deductive reasoning is not all that comprises reasoning: there is also induction. Thus, because we have not yet found a genius philosopher who could formalize and explicate for us the rules of valid inductive generalization, we could not eliminate the bias of individual human judges and juries from the common law process. The trial by jury is the common law's stand-in for a pure, unbiased reasoning court process. Its failure however, was not due to its goal being flawed, but to our knowledge being incomplete. To wit, we know the rules of valid **deductive** inference. Deductive logic has been well understood ever since Aristotle formalized it during his floruit. But deductive reasoning is not all that comprises reasoning: there is also induction. Thus, because we have not yet found a genius philosopher who could formalize and explicate for us the rules of valid inductive generalization, we could not eliminate the bias of individual human judges and juries from the common law process. The trial by jury is the common law's stand-in for a pure, unbiased reasoning court process.
Even at the time of this writing, we still have not yet formalized induction. For this reason, `Wellspring` will also have to adopt the imperfect trial by jury process - and moreover, we will still have the Achilles' heel of activist judges who will refuse to merely read the constitution as an input, and reason about its contents to draw valid inferences about whether or not a particular law is constitutional, in a originalist fashion, but will instead interpret the text of the constitution to draw the conclusions which their personal politics would prefer. Even at the time of this writing, we still have not yet formalized induction. For this reason, `Wellspring` will also have to adopt the imperfect trial by jury process - and moreover, we will still have the Achilles' heel of activist judges who will refuse to merely read the constitution as an input, and reason about its contents to draw valid inferences about whether or not a particular law is constitutional, in a originalist fashion, but will instead interpret the text of the constitution to draw the conclusions which their personal politics would prefer.