From fe5b4585ba61d80fdb448b21509947c6fe3fc279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: patergentium Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 03:43:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Update 15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md --- 15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md b/15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md index b95ede6..1b61c27 100644 --- a/15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md +++ b/15-torts-and-coordination/21-commandeered-crime.md @@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ Ultimately we may not be able to do anything about it other than create some spe There's some overlap with the blackmail framework as well. Consider the following: -Crime boss commandeers crimes from agent. Agent commits crime and collects evidence that boss commandeered the crime. Agent then flips the tables on boss and blackmails him, threatening to turn him in. Should the agent-turned-blackmailer now be chargeable with blackmail? Yes. +Crime boss commandeers crimes from agent. Agent commits crime and collects evidence that boss commandeered the crime. Agent then flips the tables on boss and blackmails him, threatening to turn him in. Should the agent-turned-blackmailer now be chargeable with blackmail? Yes. The incentives are correct: it is correct that the blackmailing agent receives a higher penalty than the boss because blackmail exacerbates the situation. Basically we are saying: whatever your situation is, do not attempt to resolve it by becoming the new crime-commander via blackmail. Instead, either turn yourself and your commandeerer in, or else bear it silently. It turns out that what we want is a way to incentivize agents of commandeerers to betray their commandeerer. \ No newline at end of file