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wellspring/07-military/07-2-sovereign-war-infrastructure.md
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Wellspring: Sovereign War Infrastructure Constitutional Law

This section of the WS outlines the guiding principles which constrain the range of flexibility the legislature has in defining the SovWI law.

Purpose of SovWI law

Principles

SovWI policy may be thought of as a species of national infrastructure planning that takes precedence over all natures policy and is the bedrock for the planning and layout of a WS polity to ensure that war-readiness goals are met. It ensures that natures allocation is first and foremost optimized to ascertain war defensibility.

SovWI policy may be used to erect military fortifications, military supply lines and military communications infrastructure; to reserve military flight routes; to build military academies, military training grounds, and military bases. SovWI infrastructure should attempt to be as minimal as possible preferring to procure natureses and rent them out under binding agreements upon the tenant to build the required infrastructure; or if the government must build the infrastructure itself, to provide backbones and not fully built infrastructure.

Under the auspices of SovWI, the military branch is the only one authorized to undertake infrastructure projects subject to justification under the published war readiness plan. This shall not be construed to prevent the Estate branch from procuring natureses to effectuate the estate requirements of the non-military branches of government.

Specific injunctions and scope limitations

Mechanisms for environmental protection are outlined elsewhere in this constitution, and SovWI law is not to be overloaded for that purpose.

SovWI projects are NOT to be undertaken for any reason other than war readiness, and if they are permanent installations, they are only to cover such works as cannot be quickly erected as needed as war approaches. This may be used as a legal rule of thumb for the courts and the plebiscite. Obviously this will and should bias utopia's military toward agility in preparation for war. A non-exhaustive list of things that SovWI shall not be overloaded for includes:

  • Environment protection concerns.
  • Forestry, park and wildlife protection.
  • Aesthetic, cultural and historical landmarks.
  • Urban/rural planning or other broader, more general infrastructure policy.

Sovereign infrastructure shall be planned carefully before title to any natures is sold by the government. In any natures title sale, the military shall have preferential procurement priority and privilege, pending justification as a national security asset, according with the published security and war readiness reports. In effect, the military shall have limited veto powers in infrastructure planning to ensure the war readiness of the military, subject to justification under the published war readiness plan.

Eminent domain

Where an asset necessary for war readiness is already possessed by a conagent or fictagent, the reimbursement rate for eminent domain shall be 120% market value, as valued by the Externality Auction. Congress shall pass no laws making it a crime for private entities to speculatively purchase natureses expecting them to be security assets in the future. That said, in order to ensure that procurements do not become a mechanism for paralyzing the military, the auction service price standard may be capped within the price range of a natures of similar value and need not be the price that the specific natures in question lists for.

Eminent domain may only be used by the military branch subject to justification under the published war readiness plan; and it is explicitly not available to any other branch of government.

Wartime interruption of service

All sovereign infrastructure which is rented out to the public (such as roads and rail, or communications) shall have a clearly defined revocation clause explaining that in the event of war, such infrastructure may become unavailable for public use indefinitely, even for paying private customers. The government shall make all reasonable attempts however, to avoid having to invoke this clause by anticipating its service-level requirements for war during peacetime and specifying them to the contract awardees so that in the event of war, there will be scant need for this clause.